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In recent years, Chinese enterprises, especially state-owned enterprises have been 
going out and playing a significant role in the area of international mergers and 
acquisitions and have achieved a lot. Meanwhile, those enterprises are also facing 
innumerous legal risks. In 2005, the failure of the case of CNOOC LIMITED merger 
and acquisition sounded the alarm bell to those Chinese companies setting out to 
merge companies in America: strong economic strength is only part of the factors 
leading to success in international merger and acquisitions and Legal review system 
of America to international mergers. And acquisitions has posed a great threat to 
International companies wanting to merge target companies in America.  
Based on recent encounters and experiences Chinese enterprises met with when 
merging American listed companies and the specific situation of the “going out” 
strategy adopted by Chinese enterprises, some countermeasures and suggestions are 
given on how to reduce legal risks caused by legal review on national security to 
cross-border M&As.  
Besides the preface and conclusion, this dissertation is divided into four parts as 
follows: 
Chapter one mainly provides an overview of standards of legal review on 
national security to international mergers and acquisitions in America, which analyzes 
effective legal standards, the possible standards of legal review in the future.    
Chapter two discusses the procedural issue of legal review on national security to 
international mergers and acquisitions in America, analyzing the starting-up 
proceeding of legal review on national security, executive organs and so on. 
Chapter three mainly analyzes the legal consequence of violating the legal 
review system on national security to international mergers and acquisitions in 
America，analyzing the legal consequence from the two aspects that involved 
corporations don’t file legal review on national security and international corporations 
are voluntary to file the legal review of national security. 
Chapter four demonstrates Chinese enterprises’ countermeasures on how to cope 















in America. With the “going out” strategy adopted by Chinese enterprises and the 
specific property right structure of Chinese state–owned enterprises, this dissertation 
brings forward some countermeasures and suggestions on how to reduce the risks of 
legal review on national security to cross-border mergers and acquisitions in America. 
 













缩  略  语  表  
 
 
缩 略 语 表 
 
简  称 全    称 
CFIUS 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
美国外国投资委员会 
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation 中国海洋石油公司 
UNOCAL American Unocal 美国 UNOCAL 
CATIC 
China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation 中国
航空技术进出口总公司 
STT 
Singapore Technologies Telemedia 
新加坡电媒技术公司 





案 例 表 
Semi-gas/Nippon Sanso 案 
NTT Communications Corp./Verio,Inc. 案 
General Ceramics/Tokuyama Soda Company 案 
CATIC/ Mamco Manufacturing Inc.案 
Nakamichi Peripherals/Magnetics Corporation's Optical Products Division 案 
Hutchison/ Global Crossing 案 
Monsanto/Huels , AG 案 
LTV/Thomson 案 
Deutsche Telekom/VoiceStream 案 
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